Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials by Chaney, Kevin R.
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 14
Number 1 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 4
9-1-1995
Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of
Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials
Kevin R. Chaney
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, International Law Commons, and the Military, War, and
Peace Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Chaney, Kevin R. (1995) "Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials," Penn State
International Law Review: Vol. 14: No. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol14/iss1/4
Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the
Lessons of Nuremberg to the Yugoslav
War Crimes Trials
Kevin R. Chaney*
I. Introduction
The best prophet of the future is the past.
Lord Byron
While recent events in the former Yugoslavia have cast doubt
on the authority of the United Nations and the ability of that body
to deal with recalcitrant belligerent powers, they have, arguably,
done more than any other conflict or event since World War II to
elevate the status of international humanitarian law and to awaken
the world to the importance of its role in the global community.
Not since 1945 has substantive and procedural international law
stood to gain so much in terms of development and prestige as it
does today. The battle for territory in the former Yugoslavia has
created what is perhaps the ideal laboratory for testing the mettle
of modern humanitarian law and the resolve of those who wield it.
The war in the former Yugoslavia has produced charges of
crimes against humanity by every belligerent faction. Both Serbia
and Bosnia-Herzegovina have petitioned the United Nations
demanding satisfaction under international law. Additionally,
Bosnia-Herzegovina instituted proceedings in the International
Court of Justice against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro), alleging the latter had committed acts of
genocide.1 That the belligerent factions themselves have attempted
* Lecturer, Department of History, University of Nebraska at Omaha. The
author would like to thank Mr. Robert L. McGeorge, Esq., U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Dr. Lloyd E. Ambrosius, University of Nebraska - Lincoln, and Mr. Gary L.
Young, Esq. for their comments on earlier drafts.
1. Official Document: International Court of Justice: Case Concerning
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime
of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia) 1993 I.CJ. 29 (Apr. 16). See
also International Court of Justice: Order on Further Requests for the Indication
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to invoke international law, may serve to facilitate the Security
Council's task of asserting the legitimacy of the law of nations and
its attempts to adjudicate and punish violators of the law, in the
former Yugoslavia..
The Yugoslav war crimes trials, however, present a situation
far removed from that at Nuremberg. Unlike the adjudication of
the Nazi war criminals, the application of international law to the
Balkan situation does not involve a vanquished power. Nor do the
adjudications involve the administration of justice by an occupying
power. Clearly, it is under circumstances such as these that the
legitimacy, credibility and binding character of humanitarian law
may be best manifested. These are the qualities the Nuremberg
visionaries hoped international law would develop under the
direction of the first international tribunal and during the years
following the war.2 It is possible that much of what was sought by
Robert Jackson,3 Henry Stimson,a and others who worked to
advance international law in the postwar years, may finally be
realized as a result of the Bosnian Conflict. The United Nations is
presented with an opportunity to systematically and impartially
apply international humanitarian law to the conduct of sovereign
states without first having to replace their governments. Thus, the
body of law may be advanced, the legitimacy of that law may be
established, and a more persuasively deterrent standard raised:
everything hoped for by the framers of the first international
tribunal.
While the response of the United Nations to events in the
former Yugoslavia may deserve criticism, the Security Council has,
albeit halfheartedly, taken reasonable efforts to ensure that the
conduct of the various factions is subject to international humani-
tarian law. Whether these measures have been undertaken merely
to "expiate the conscience of [the] Powers-that-run-the-world," 5 or
of Provisional Measures in the Case Concerning Application of the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegov-
ina v. Yugoslavia) reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1599 (1993).
2. See, e.g., Henry L. Stinson, The Nuremberg Trial: Landmark in Law, 25
FOREIGN AFF. 179, 188-89 (1947); Robert H. Jackson, Forward: The Nurnberg
Trial Becomes an Historic Precedent, 20 TEMP. L.Q. 167 (1946); Robert H.
Jackson, Justice Jackson's Final Report to the President Concerning the Nurnberg
War Crimes Trial, reprinted in 20 TEMP. L.Q. 338 (1946).
3. United States Supreme Court Justice, and Chief U.S. prosecutor at
Nuremberg.
4. United States Secretary of War, 1940-45.
5. Surya Prakash Sinha, Symposium: Should There Be An International
Tribunal for Crimes Against Humanity? An Introductory Note, 6 PACE INT'L L.
LESSONS OF NUREMBERG
whether they have been determined to constitute the best course
of action, the steps that have been taken by the Security Council
have, from late 1992 to present, been relatively decisive and
expeditious. Through several resolutions, the Security Council has
condemned the violations of humanitarian law by the parties to the
conflict,6 reaffirmed the obligation of the warring powers to abide
by existing law,7 and sought a means of investigating and trying
alleged violators.8  On October 6, 1992 the Security Council
requested the formation of an impartial commission to investigate
alleged atrocities.9 Eight days afterward, the Secretary General
issued a report which provided for the creation of a five-member
Commission of Experts.10 In a communique dated February 10,
1993, the Commission of Experts submitted an interim report to the
Security Council'1 noting the occurrence of violations of interna-
tional humanitarian law in the former Yugoslavia, including "willful
killing, ethnic cleansing, mass killings, torture, rape, pillage and
destruction of civilian property, destruction of cultural and religious
property and arbitrary arrests." 2  The Security Council con-
demned the occurrences, determined that the situation constituted
a threat to international peace and security, and further decided to
establish a tribunal to adjudicate alleged offenders. 3 On May 25,
1993 the Security Council responded to "continuing reports of
widespread and flagrant violations of humanitarian law"14 in the
former Yugoslavia by establishing the first ad hoc international
tribunal since World War II."5 On September 17, 1993 the United
REV. 1 (1993).
6. See S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1468 (1992); S.C.
Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1470 (1992); S.C. Res. 787, U.N.
SCOR, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1481 (1992).
7. See S.C. Res. 764, U.N. SCOR, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1465 (1992); S.C.
Res. 771, U.N. SCOR, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1470 (1992).
8. See S.C. REs. 780, U.N. SCOR, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1476 (1992).
9. See id.
10. Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/24657. For a general survey
of the Commission of Experts, its historical antecedents and its investigations, see
M. Cherif Bassiouni, Current Development: The U.N. Commission of Experts
Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), 88 A.J.I.L. 784
(Oct. 1994).
-1. Interim Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/25274 (Feb. 10, 1993).
12. Id.
13. See Report of the Secretary General, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32
I.L.M. 1163, at 1165.
14. Id.
15. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1203 (1993).
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Nations General Assembly elected eleven judges from eleven
different countries to serve on what the Security Council denomi-
nated the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian
Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia. 6 In
May 1994, the Commission of Experts submitted the findings of its
investigation to the office of the Prosecutor.17  Consisting of
64,000 pages of evidence and 300 hours of video tape, the.Commis-
sion's findings reaffirmed and expanded its earlier report of
genocide and grave breaches of international humanitarian law. 8
It is not surprising that the Security Council's efforts toward
the investigation and adjudication of the Balkan situation are not
unlike those taken by the Allies in 1945. Nor is it surprising that
reference has been made to the Nuremberg Trials and the
International Military Tribunal.19  Nuremberg was the first
international effort to redress violations of conventional and
customary international law. Moreover, no subsequent effort has
generated more critical scholarship than those historic proceedings.
This critical scholarship may be counted among the most valuable
sources at the disposal of the Security Council and the Internation-
al Tribunal, and may serve as a suitable guide as these organs
attempt to bring several sovereign states under the tenuous
authority of international law.
Prudent and successful administration of a modern war crimes
trial clearly depends upon a close reading of past efforts, and
particularly, a close examination of the Nuremberg Trials. It
appears that the Security Council, notwithstanding the glaring
shortcomings of the Nuremberg effort, has already taken steps
which will likely invite much of the same criticism that followed the
first international war crimes trials. Substantive and warranted
16. The judges are serving a four year term which began on November 17,
1993 and they, like the judges of the I.C.J., may be re-elected at the end of their
term. Current Development: Election of the Judges of the International Tribunal
for Violations of Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, 87 A.J.I.L. 668
(Oct. 1993). The judges on the International: Tribunal are Georges Michel Abi-
Saab (Egypt), Antonio Cassese (Italy), Jules Deschenes (Canada), Adolphus
Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria), Germain Le Foyer De Costil (France), Li Haopei
(China), Gabrielle Kirk McDonald (United States), Elizabeth Odio Benito (Costa
Rica), Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), Sir Ninian Stephen (Australia), and Lal
Chand Vohrah (Malaysia). Id.
17. Final Report of the Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992), U.N. Doc. S/1994/674 (May 27, 1994).
18. See id.
19. See, e.g., Bassiouni, supra note 10, passim.
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criticism will, of course, further taint an already suspect effort and
may threaten the legitimacy and advancement of humanitarian law.
While the degree of future success of the Yugoslav Trials can
only be the subject of speculation, the steps already taken, as well
as those being contemplated by the United Nations, may be
measured by those steps taken fifty years ago. As the United
Nations does not enjoy the advantage of an uncontested, pre-
approved manual governing war crimes resolution, it is useful,
eminently practical, and strongly advisable to render close examina-
tion to the critical scholarship generated by the Nuremberg Trials;
and by this commentary, the Security Council and the International
Tribunal should measure their every move. For, while it may seem
quite clich6, history in this instance is not merely a convenient
guide, it is the only guide.
II. The International Tribunal: Law and Procedure at Nurem-
berg
The events that prompted the formation of the International
Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg are probably more familiar
to most than those which led to the formation of the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The decision by the Allies to
convene an international tribunal, however, went through several
stages before resulting in the IMT. A brief examination of these
stages provides some understanding of the Allied policy goals
which produced the first international war crimes trials, and likely
shaped the thinking of the framers of the recent tribunal.
As Allied forces pressed into Germany and an end to the
fighting in Europe came into sight, the Allied powers faced the task
of establishing an acceptable procedure for dealing with the
surviving Nazi leadership. Between October 1943 and January
1944, the United States and Great Britain helped establish the
United Nations War Crimes Commission, and it was officially
declared in November 1943 by Washington, London, and Moscow
that the German leadership would be punished for its aggression
and its wartime conduct.' ° As hostilities in the European theater
came to a close, the Allied powers were confronted with three
options. They could conclude the war with a handshake, as the
great powers of the nineteenth century often did, reestablishing a
20. Moscow Protocol, 1943 For. Rel. (1)749, Annex 10, 1 Nov. 1943, 3 Bevans
816, 834.
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balance of power in Europe by exacting no penalty from Germa-
ny.21  Alternatively, the victorious powers could summarily
execute the Nazi leadership. The Allies avoided the two extremes
by placing Nazi leaders on trial before the world and permitting
German wartime policies and conduct to be adjudicated by an
international tribunal.
The dilemma prompted several suggestions. Stalin, half-
jokingly, proposed the liquidation of 50,000 Nazis.22 The British
government advocated the summary execution of the major war
criminals and judicial proceedings for lesser ones. 3  And the
United States proposed the Morganthau Plan, which provided for
the de-industrialization of Germany to penalize the civilian
population for their collective guilt, along with the wholesale arrest
of members of the Schutz-Staffel (S.S.) and the Sturm Abteilung
(S.A.), as well as the summary execution of the major war
criminals.24 Ultimately, the Allies settled upon a course of action
proposed by United States Secretary of War, Henry Stimson.
Under Stimson's plan, all alleged Nazi war criminals would be
brought to trial before an international tribunal. The plan appears
to have had several objectives. Foremost, judicial proceedings
might avert future hostilities which were likely to result from the
execution, absent a trial, of alleged offenders. Legal proceedings
would bring German policies and conduct to the attention of all the
world, and the trial and dissemination of information would
legitimize Allied conduct during and after the war. Additionally,
a trial, it was hoped, would advance and legitimize international
law. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, judicial proceedings
would permit the Allied powers, and the world, to exact a penalty
from the Nazi leadership rather than from Germany's civilian
population.
21. For a concise history of modem foreign relations, see GORDON A. CRAIG
& ALEXANDER L. GEORGE, FORCE AND STATECRAFT (2d ed. 1990).
22. Stalin had allegedly compiled a list of 50,000 Nazi war criminals. JOE J.
HEYDECKER & JOHANNES LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL, 77-78 (R. A. Downie
Trans., 1962) [hereinafter HEYDECKER & LEEB]. During the Tehran Conference,
following a banquet attended by Roosevelt and Churchill, the Soviet dictator
proposed a toast, stating, "I drink to the quickest possible justice for all German
war criminals. I drink to the justice of a firing squad." Id. When Churchill
objected, Stalin again raised his glass and proclaimed, "Fifty thousand must be
shot." Id.
23. TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS: A
PERSONAL MEMOIR 29 (1992).
24. Id. at 31.
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In the summer of 1945, representatives from the United States,
Great Britain, the Provisional Government of France and the
Soviet Union gathered in London to establish the guidelines for
dealing with alleged Nazi war criminals. The result of the confer-
ence was the Protocol for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major
War Criminals of the European Axis,2" which included an annex
entitled Charter of the International, Military Tribunal.26 The
Protocol and Charter collectively comprise what is commonly called
the Charter of London, or the London Agreement. Eventually
gathering twenty-three signatories, the Charter of London set forth
four counts under which alleged war criminals could be indicted: 1)
crimes against the peace;27 2) war crimes;' 3) crimes against
humanity;29 and 4) common plan or conspiracy." The subject-
matter jurisdiction of the Tribunal was drawn principally from the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907,31 the Geneva Conventions
of 1925 and 1929,32 and the laudable, but unrealistic, Kellogg-
25. Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European
Axis, 59 Stat. 1544 (1945).
26. Charter of the International Tribunal, 3 Bevans 1239 [hereinafter Charter].
27. Namely, planning, preparation, initiating or waging of a war of aggression,
or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or the
participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the
foregoing. Charter, supra note 26, art. 6, para. 3.
28. Namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall
include, but are not limited to, murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labor
or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory, murder
or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages,
plunder of public or private property, and wanton destruction of cities, towns, or
villages not justified by military necessity. Id. para. 4.
29. Namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war,
or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not
in violation of the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Id. para. 5.
30. Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the
formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution
of such plan. Id. para. 6.
31. Particular emphasis was placed upon Hague IV of the 1907 Convention,
the Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, and Hague
X of the 1907 Convention, the Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime
Warfare of Principles of the Geneva Convention.
32. Regarding inhumane weapons and practices, see Geneva Protocol for
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of
Bacterial Methods of Warfare, June 17, 1925, 26 U.S.T. 571, T.I.A.S. No. 8061, 94
L.N.T.S. 65 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]; Geneva Convention, Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2021, T.S. 846, 2 Bevans 932
[hereinafter Geneva Convention].
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Briand Pact of 1928."3 The personal jurisdiction of the IMT
extended to any persons "acting in the interests of the European
Axis countries, whether as individuals or members of organiza-
tions," through the commission of the enumerated crimes.
3 4
The first international tribunal was to consist of four judges
and their alternates, representing the United States, Great Britain,
France and the Soviet Union, appointed by their respective
countries.35 The Charter provided no criteria for the selection of
the Tribunal's officers, but stipulated that neither the Court, nor its
members, could be challenged by the prosecution or the defen-
dants. Article 14 of the Charter provided for the appointment of
a chief prosecutor by each of the principal signatories. The four
prosecutors and their staffs, acting as a committee, were charged
with the investigation and prosecution of the alleged war criminals,
as well as the drafting of rules of procedure which the Tribunal was
empowered to accept, amend, or reject.36
The drafters of the Charter, operating under the specter of
pretense, took considerable pains to ensure a fair trial for those
indicted. Each defendant was to be accorded a translated copy of
the indictment and given the choice of conducting his own defense
or utilizing the assistance of counsel.37 The accused would also be
granted his choice of counsel at the expense of the Allied pow-
ers,a3 and would be permitted access to all documentation in the
possession of the prosecution. The Tribunal was given the
authority to pass final, nonreviewable judgment regarding the guilt
or innocence of each defendant,39 and was further empowered to
impose upon convicted defendants, sentences of "death and such
punishment as shall be determined by it to be just. '
33. Article I: The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of
their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of
international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in
their relations with one another. Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, Aug. 27, 1928, 46
Stat. 2343, T.S. 796, 2 Bevans 732.
Article II: The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or
resolution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever origin they may be, which may
arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.
34. Id. para. 1.
35. Charter, supra note 26, art. 2.
36. Id. art. 14.
37. Id. art. 16. The defendants at Nuremberg enjoyed the services of twenty-
seven lead counsels, fifty-four assistants, and sixty-seven secretaries. HEYDECKER
& LEEB, supra note 22, at 94.
38. Charter, supra note 26, art. 30.
39. Id. art. 26.
40. Id. art. 27.
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On November 20, 1945 the trials of the major war criminals
commenced and were carried out over 284 days. The prosecution
produced 2,630 documents, and the defense produced 2700.4' The
court took statements from 240 witnesses, 42 and received 300,000
affidavits. 3 Finally, on October 1, 1946 the International Military
Tribunal delivered its verdicts. Of the twenty-two Nazi defendants,
three were acquitted, four received prison terms not exceeding
twenty years, two were sentenced to life in prison, and thirteen
were sentenced to death.' Many lesser war criminals were tried
over the next three years by military tribunals within the respective
zones of occupation. Additionally, many non-German collaborators
were tried for treason by their own governments.45
III. The International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
As the IMT presided over the Nuremberg proceedings, it did
so without benefit of a precedent. The Security Council, on the
other hand, may look to the IMT; and it appears that the Council
has learned from some of the mistakes of Nuremberg for, in many
respects, the Statute of the International Tribunal stands in rather
sharp contrast to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal.
Moreover, the circumstances under which the Yugoslav Tribunal
was formed are somewhat removed from those that resulted in the
IMT. These differences, coupled with the marked developments in
conventional law and international organizations, has produced a
judicial body unlike the Nuremberg Tribunal with respect to
establishment, structure, and legal basis.
Established by Security Council Resolution 827, 6 the Interna-
tional Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia finds its legal basis in
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VII
authorizes the Security Council, once it has determined the
existence of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or an act of
aggression, to take such measures as may be necessary to maintain
or restore international peace and security.47 It was under these
41. HEYDECKER & LEEB, supra note 22, at 94.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, reprinted in 20
TEMP. L.Q. 168, 316-17 (1946).
45. See, e.g., BERTRAM R. GORDON, COLLABORATIONISM IN FRANCE
DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR (1980).
46. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 15.
47. U.N. CHARTER, art. 42.
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auspices that the International Tribunal was formed and legitimat-
ed.
The Statute of the International Tribunal, which was drafted
in compliance with Resolution 808,48 sets forth in thirty-four
articles the composition, jurisdiction, and function of the Interna-
tional Tribunal.4 The Statute places within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Tribunal violations of the Geneva Conventions
of 1949,5o the 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws
and Customs of War on Land and its annexes,51 the 1948 Conven-
tion on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crimes of Geno-
cide,52 and those crimes against humanity set forth in the Charter
48. S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163
(1993).
49. Statute of the International Tribunal, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/25704
Annex, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter Statute].
50. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing, or ordering to be committed, grave breaches of the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely the following acts against persons or
property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(a) wilful killing; (b) torture or inhumane treatment, including
biological experiments; (c) wilfully causing great suffering or serious
injury to body or health; (d) extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly; (e) compelling a prisoner of war or a civilian to serve in
the forces of a hostile power; (f) wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or
a civilian of the rights of fair and regular trial; (g) unlawful deportation
or transfer or unlawful confinement of a civilian; (h) taking civilians as
hostages.
Id. art 2.
51. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
violating the laws or customs of war. Such violations shall include, but are not
limited to:
(a) employment of poisonous weapons or other weapons calculated
to cause unnecessary suffering; (b) wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity; (c) attack or
bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages,
dwellings, or buildings; (d) seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done
to institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and
sciences, historic monuments and works of art and science; (e) plunder
of public and private property.
Id. art. 3.
52. 1. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
committing genocide as defined in paragraph 2 of this article or of committing any
of the other acts enumerated in paragraph 3 of this article.
2. Genocide means any of the following acts committed with the intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
(a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or
mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction
in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births
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of the Nuremberg Tribunal and Law No. 10 of the Control Council
for Germany.53 With regard to this jurisdiction, the wording
differs from that of the Charter; however, the substance remains
essentially the same. Unlike the IMT, however, the International
Tribunal has not been granted jurisdiction over crimes against the
peace. This distinction is the only substantive difference between
the two texts with respect to subject-matter jurisdiction. Although
the Statute expressly denominates the crime of genocide54 and sets
it out as a separate category in the document, essentially the same
conduct is enumerated under crimes against humanity in the
Charter.55
Personal jurisdiction has not been expanded from the Charter
to the Statute, but the troubling matter of individual criminal
responsibility has been developed and presented in greater detail
in the latter.56 The Statute grants the International Tribunal
jurisdiction over all natural persons accused of committing the
enumerated acts within the territory of the former Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia. The temporal jurisdiction of the
Tribunal is clearly delineated and limited to crimes occurring after
January 1, 1991." The Charter, on the other hand, permitted the
IMT jurisdiction over violations occurring "before or after the war,
presumably back to 1933." 59
within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to
another group.
3. The following acts shall be punishable:
(a) genocide; (b) conspiracy to commit genocide; (c) direct and
public incitement to commit genocide; (d) attempt to commit genocide;
(e) complicity in genocide.
Id. art. 4.
53. The International Tribunal shall have the power to prosecute persons
responsible for the following crimes when committed in armed conflict, whether
international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian population:
(a) murder; (b) extermination; (c) enslavement; (d) deportation; (e)
imprisonment; (f) torture; (g) rape; (h) persecutions on political, racial
and religious grounds; (i) other inhumane acts.
Id. art. 5.
54. Id. art. 4.
55. Charter, supra note 26, art. 6(c).
56. Statute, supra note 49, art. 7(1).
57. Id. art. 6. The Statute further sets forth in article 7 the principle of
individual responsibility, irrespective of station, -for violations of international law.
Id. art. 7. The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia now consists of the
independent republics of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Slovenia, and
the current Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
58. Id. art. 8.
59. Charter, supra note 26, art. 6(c).
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Another noticeable difference between the two documents is
the provision in the Statute which grants concurrent jurisdiction to
national courts within the territory of the former Yugoslavia.'
Under the Statute, the International Tribunal is given primacy over
other courts, but may not try a defendant who has already been
prosecuted for one of the enumerated crimes in a national court
unless it is held that the proceedings were not impartial or
independent, not diligently prosecuted, or "were designed to shield
the accused from international criminal responsibility."61
Regarding the composition of the International Tribunal, the
Security Council has taken steps to create a more universal court
than that provided for under the Charter of London. Pursuant to
Article 12 of the Statute, the International Tribunal is composed of
eleven judges from as many countries, each of whom possesses "the
qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment
to the highest judicial offices."'62 No two judges may be nationals
of the same state.63 Furthermore, the Statute provides for a court
that is to be elected by the General Assembly.'
The International Tribunal is divided into three organs: the
Chambers, the Prosecutor, and the Registry. The Chambers is
comprised of two Trial Chambers which consist of three judges
each, and an Appellate Chamber which is composed of five
judges.6" The Statute consolidates the office of the Prosecutor
under the directorship of one person appointed by the Security
Council following nomination by the Secretary General,' rather
than creating a cumbersome coalition by requiring each country
represented on the Tribunal to provide its own prosecutor and
staff. It was the bureaucracy created by four prosecutors and four
staffs that presented one of the greatest obstacles to efficiency and
fair proceedings at Nuremberg. The Statute further provides that
the Prosecutor will work independently of the rest of the Tribunal
and will not be permitted to seek or receive instruction from any
outside source.67
The third organ of the Tribunal, the Registry, serves as the
administrative organ of the Court, facilitating the efforts of the
60. Statute, supra note 49, art. 9.
61. Id. art. 10, at § 2(b).
62. Id. art. 13, at § 1.
63. Id. art. 12.
64. Id. art. 13, at § 2.
65. Id. art. 13, at § 2.
66. Id. art. 16, at § 4.
67. Id. art. 16, at § 2.
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Chambers and the Prosecutor. 68 Among the most notable differ-
ences between the Charter and the Statute is the inclusion in the
latter of an appellate chamber. While the judgment of the IMT
regarding the guilt or innocence of the Nuremberg defendants was
nonreviewable, the International Tribunal for the former Yugosla-
via will hear appeals from the Prosecution and defendants on the
grounds of error of fact, or error with regard to a question of law
resulting in a miscarriage of justice.69
Noticeably expanded from the Charter to the Statute are the
rights to be accorded the accused. Like the IMT, the Tribunal is
to ensure that each defendant is provided with a detailed explana-
tion, in a language which is known to him, of the "nature and cause
of the charge[s] against him."7 Additionally, as at Nuremberg,
the accused is to be permitted the services of counsel of his own
choosing, and is to be permitted the time and facilities necessary to
conduct an adequate defense.71 If the accused is found guilty of
a serious violation of international humanitarian law, however, the
International Tribunal, unlike the IMT, may impose a sentence
limited to imprisonment, 72 presumably for life.73  Additionally,
the Statute provides that the accused may not be tried in absen-
tia.7t The Charter of the International Military Tribunal, in
contrast, did not preclude such hearings. As a result, Martin
Bormann, Head of the Party Chancellery, was tried, convicted and
sentenced to death despite the Allies inability to locate him.75
Still another difference lies in the defendant's right to not be
placed in double jeopardy. Indeed, the Charter expressly states
that any person convicted by the IMT may be charged subsequently
by a national court for any crime other than membership in a
76criminal organization. Consequently, Nuremberg defendants
Hjalmar Schacht, Franz von Papen, and Hans Fritzsche were
68. Id. art. 17.
69. Id. art 25, at § 1.
70. Id. art. 21, at § 4(a).
71. Id. § 4(b).
72. Id. art. 24, at § 1.
73. No term limits are stipulated in the Statute. The Statute grants the
International Tribunal recourse to the domestic practice of the courts of the
former Yugoslavia in determining suitable terms of imprisonment. Id. art. 24, at§ 1.
74. Id. art. 21, at § 4(d).
75. JUDGMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 44,
at 317.
76. Charter, supra note 26, art. 11.
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prosecuted in German courts following prosecution by the
Tribunal.77
The Statute of the International Tribunal and the Charter of
the International Military Tribunal differ in many respects. The
Statute is considerably more explicit regarding to subject-matter
and personal jurisdiction and limits the latter to a greater degree
than does the Charter.78 The Court itself is more diverse. Its
members have been seated only by the consent of the General
Assembly7 9 and its ability to mete out punishment is limited to
imprisonment, and then only within the boundaries of Yugoslav
law.80  Furthermore, the composition of the Tribunal, which
includes one independent Prosecutor and a separate appellate
chamber, more closely resembles municipal judiciaries and may
provide a more fair and just process than that conducted under the
IMT and will likely prove more efficient. Yet many of the same
weaknesses may be inherent in both instruments.
The organization of the IMT and Nuremberg proceedings have
been found lacking in several respects. Not surprisingly, the
Tribunal and the Nuremberg Trials have become the focus of
numerous pieces of critical scholarship. In an effort to successfully
adjudicate alleged war criminals of the former Yugoslavia and
avoid future discredit, the International Tribunal and the Security
Council would be well served by a thorough examination of the
criticism prompted by the Nuremberg effort.
IV. Nuremberg in Retrospect: Critical Commentary
The Nuremberg Trials have generated literature from three
principle groups of scholars. These works suggest three different
perceptions of the political and legal nature of the proceedings. As
may be expected, the strongest and broadest criticism of the
substantive and procedural law invoked at the trials originates
among German legal scholars. Also critical, although generally
supportive of the proceedings for their role in the restabilization of
postwar Europe, are English and American historians. Finally, the
most ardent advocates of the trials generally are found among
English and American jurists and legal scholars.
77. ANN TuSA & JOHN TUSA, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 477-78 (1984).
78. Statute, supra note 49, arts. 1-7.
79. Id. arts. 11-12.
80. Id. art. 24.
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A. German Legal Scholars
Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege.
Of the three principal groups of commentators on the
Nuremberg Trials, German legal scholars have produced the
harshest criticism. Almost withbut exception, these writings evince
a decidedly realist perspective of the proceedings. The key actors
are understood to be nation-states motivated by national interest,
security, and power, with little genuine regard for the advancement
of international law, humanitarian or otherwise. These writings
generally denounce as contrived, the role that American exception-
alism,81 or more accurately, Anglo-American exceptionalism,
played in the formation of the Tribunal and the execution of the
proceedings. Additionally, the German authors focus little upon
world public opinion as a driving force behind the trials, and often
draw attention, implicitly or explicitly, to the ideology of the four
Allied powers as a motivating factor.'
The most frequently raised legal objection concerns the
application by the Tribunal of ex post facto law. It is widely held
among the German scholars that the law applied at Nuremberg had
its origins in the Charter of London, drafted on August 8, 1945,
rather than in existing conventional and customary law.' Implicit
in this assertion is a reliance upon the doctrine of rebus sic
standibus, or the nullification of binding treaties because of
circumstances. It assumes that the Hague Conventions of 1899 and
1907, and the Geneva Conventions of 1925 and 1929 ceased to bind
Germany once it was at war with other signatories to the agree-
81. For a concise and insightful treatment of the United States's self-perceived
role as a moral, legal and political exemplar, see GEIR LUNDESTAD, THE
AMERICAN "EMPIRE" (1990).
82. See, e.g., Hans Ehard, The Nuremberg Trial Against the Major War
,Criminals and International Law, 43 AJ.I.L. 223, 233 (1949); Otto Kranzbuhler,
Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, 14 DEPAUL L. REV. 333, 334 (1964)
[hereinafter Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward].
83. See Ehard, supra note 82 and accompanying text. See also Otto
Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg As a Legal Problem, in NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS
OF THE WAR TRIALS (Wilbourn E. Benton & Georg Grimm eds., 1955);
Kranzbuehler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 333; Otto
Pannenbecker, The Nuremberg War-Crimes Trial, 14 DEPAUL L. REv. 348 (1964);
Herbert Kraus, The Nuremberg Trial of the Major War Criminals: Reflections After
Seventeen Years, 13 DEPAUL L. REv. 233 (1963); Karl S. Bader, in NUREMBERG:
GERMAN VIEWS OF THE WAR TRIALS (Wilboum E. Benton & Georg Grimm eds.,
1955).
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ments. Reliance upon this principle, however, is erroneous in this
instance if, as is often argued, the laws that the major war criminals
were charged with violating may be held to have been jus cogens
law. If they were indeed preemptory norms, then neither subse-
quent agreement, nor circumstances, nor German policy or law
could supersede these laws. Thus, the Charter of London may
rightfully be construed as the legal basis of the IMT, as Chapter
VII of the Charter of the United Nations may be construed to be
the legal basis for the International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia, and may be looked upon as a restatement of the
existing law. The instrument itself, however, clearly was not the
source of the law.
The writings which acknowledge pre-Charter law as the
foundation of the trials often question the application of that law
to criminal proceedings. In other words, those scholars who
recognize as binding the Hague and Geneva Conventions and the
Kellogg-Briand Pact often suggest that while these agreements may
have unequivocally declared aggressive war, war crimes and crimes
against humanity to be immoral, and rendered such conduct illegal,
they possessed no penal element, and thus no penal capacity.'
Another point of contention for German scholars was the
charge of conspiracy or common plan.5 This charge permitted
the Allied prosecutors to reach members of the various Nazi
organizations who otherwise would have escaped indictment.
Through the charge of conspiracy or common plan, the Tribunal
was able to indict the members of the Reich Cabinet, along with
the upper strata of the S.S., S.A., S.D., Gestapo, Leadership Corps,
and the General Staff. While these individuals were not directly
involved in the planning or commission of the enumerated crimes,
they could be brought before the court for directly facilitating
illegal conduct. Not only was the indictment of organizations
patently novel under international law, the principle of conspiracy
was exclusive to Anglo-American jurisprudence. Indeed, the
charge caused considerable confusion not only for the German
84. See Kraus, supra note 83, at 245; Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years
Afterward, supra note 82, at 340; Ehard, supra note 82, at 236.
85. See Carl Haensel, The Nuremberg Trial Revisited, 13 DEPAUL L. REv. 248
(1963); Kurt Behling, The Nuremberg Judgments, in NUREMBERG: GERMAN
VIEWS OF THE WAR TRIALS (Wilboum E. Benton & Georg Grimm Eds., 1955);
Kraus, supra note 83, at 245; Ehard, supra note 82, at 226-27, 231; Pannenbecker,
supra note 83, at 341.
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defense counsel, but for the French and Soviet prosecutors as
well. 6 It has been noted that had the IMT omitted this allegedly
"dubious and illegal charge" of all the defendants, only Rudolph
Hess, whom Churchill considered more deserving of psychological
care than punishment, would have been acquitted.'
Also decried as novel, and as a violation of Rousseau's Social
Contract, was the practice of subjecting individual actors, including
heads of state, to the law of nations.88 German scholars have
often suggested that heads of state act on behalf of their govern-
ments and, thus, should be held accountable only under the law of
the actor's nation. 9 The point, however, is moot. As Nuremberg
defense attorney Herbert Krause has pointed out, "Hitler was dead
when the [s]tatute was issued and it was not applicable to Admiral
Donitz, even if one wished to assume that he was Chief of State for
a short time."'9 Likewise, it has been suggested that those who
carried out crimes under orders from a superior were confronted
with a Hobson's choice and should not be subjected to internation-
al law.9'
Criticism abounds regarding the Tribunal's failure to indict
Allied offenders.92 Also criticized was the Allies' failure to
appoint a judge from a neutral country, or a judge from Germany
to the IMT.93 It has been suggested that once they had been
thoroughly apprised of Hitler's policies and Nazi conduct, the
German people would have dealt justly with the accused. 94 The
treatment administered by the German courts to those acquitted by
the Tribunal is perhaps a testimony to this claim. The perfunctory
execution of the Leipzig Trials by German courts following the
First World War, however, may have left the Allies unpersuaded.
86. BRADLEY F. SMrrH, THE ROAD TO NUREMBERG 52 (1981) [hereinafter
ROAD TO NUREMBERG].
87. Pannenbecker, supra note 83, at 351.
88. Behling, supra note 85, at 177-88; Kraus, supra note 83, at 238; Kranzbuh-
ler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 339; Ehard, supra note
82, at 232-36; Haensel, supra note 85, at 251-52.
89. Kraus, supra note 83, at 243; Ehard, supra note 82, at 233; Bader, supra
note 83, at 178; Haensel, supra note 85, at 253.
90. Kraus, supra note 83, at 239.
91. Kraus, supra note 83, at 238; Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years
Afterward, supra note 82, at 339.
92. Kranzbuhler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 334;
Ehard, supra note 82, at 238-39, 241; Haensel, supra note 85, at 258.
93. Kraus, supra note 83, at 247; Ehard, supra note 82, at 243; Haensel, supra
note 85, at 258.
94. Behling, supra note 85, at 179.
1995]
74 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:1
In addition to frequent criticism of the conspiracy charge and
the Tribunal's failure to try Allied offenders, there is another
contention common to many of the German writings. It is the
presumption that German municipal should have served as a guide
for the substantive and procedural law invoked at the proceedings,
a claim which curiously ignores the widely accepted principle that
municipal law is invoked for international adjudication only in the
absence of relevant customary or conventional law."
German legal scholars have published the harshest and
broadest criticism of the Nuremberg Trials. The proceedings have
been roundly denounced as "a tool of Allied foreign policy and
American occupational policy,"96 the purpose of which was to
"morally uplift and re-educate the German people" in line with
western political ideals.97 The proceedings have been called
"historical trials in which one political system, namely the demo-
cratic one, held court over another system, that is, the dictatorial
one."98 Moreover, it has been suggested that international law
was "knowingly disregarded" at Nuremberg,99 and that the trials
possessed little future value."°° There seems to be some consen-
sus among German commentators, however, that despite its
tenuous legal basis, the IMT carried out its mission with notable
objectivity and fairness and did what it could to facilitate the
defense of the accused.01
B. English and American Historians
Dieser Prozess hat nur eine eisige tatsAchliche Grundlage,
nicht das Recht, sondern den alten Machtgrundsatz 'Vae victis!'
Anonymous Nuremberg defendant'0°
English and American historians constitute another principal
group of commentators on the Nuremberg Trials. Like German
95. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 102 (1987).
96. Kranzbuehler, supra note 83, at 106.
97. Ehard, supra note 82, at 233.
98. Kranzbuehler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 334.
99. Id. at 335.
100. Pannenbecker, supra note 83, at 358.
101. See Karl-Heinz Lueders, The Nuremberg Judgment: Penal Jurisdiction
Over Citizens of Enemy States, in NUREMBERG: GERMAN VIEWS OF THE WAR
TRIALS 127-35 (Wilboum E. Benton and Georg Grimm eds., 1955); Kraus, supra
note 83, at 246; Haensel, supra note 85, at 258.
102. "This trial has only one single, actual foundation, not the law, but the old
power maxim 'Vae victis!"'
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legal scholars, writers within this group characteristically exhibit a
realist perspective of the proceedings. Law is ultimately a political
affair"~ and the focus of the trials' organizers was future interna-
tional security, perhaps at the expense of present justice."' The
proceedings, it is suggested, were conducted as much for political
purposes as for judicial ones.1 5 According to one Nuremberg
scholar, it is only as a politicall event that the trials may be
defended." It has been further suggested that the legal aspects
of the trials were never fixed or well-defined"°7 and that their
purpose was clearly a political one - to justify the war against
Germany, to legitimize postwar Allied policies, and to help smooth
America's transition to superpower status."~ Toward this end,
international politics were cloaked in the guise of due process,' °
which consisted at best, of a tendentious reading of international
law.'10
There seems to be little emphasis upon Anglo-American
exceptionalism in this body of literature, save references to
American predominance in the formation of the proceedings,'
and little concern is evinced for the role played by Anglo-American
ideology in planning the proceedings. There is among historians a
considerable focus upon the role of public opinion in the formation
and execution of the trials,' and it has been noted that the IMT
faced the difficult task of weighing justice against universal
outrage."3
The scholarship of this group is generally critical of the
procedure implemented by the Allies. The Tribunal is criticized as
103. TUSA & TUSA, supra note 77, at 492.
104. Michael Biddis, The Nuremberg Trial: Two Exercises in Judgment, 16 J.
CONTEMP. HIST. 597, 611 (1981).
105. See EUGENE DAVIDSON, TRIAL OF THE GERMANS (1966); BRADLEY F.
SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT NUREMBERG (1977) [hereinafter REACHING
JUDGMENT]. See generally BRADLEY F. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra
note 86; TELFORD TAYLOR, supra note 23; Biddis, supra note 104.
106. DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 592.
107. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT, supra note 105, at xvii.
108. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 252.
109. See id. at 249; SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT, supra note 105, at xiv.
110. Biddis, supra note 104, at 610.
111. See TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 4; SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra
note 86, at 50-75.
112. See SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 9, 248; TAYLOR,
supra note 23, at 26; GEOFFREY BEST, NUREMBERG AND AFTER: THE
CONTINUING HISTORY OF WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 8
(1984).
113. BEST, supra note 112, at 8.
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an inadequate forum for establishing a new order,1"4 and it has
been suggested that neither the consistency nor efficiency of the
judicial process was elevated through its association with interna-
tional politics."5 Yet, no viable alternative for dealing with the
alleged violators has been offered. Telford Taylor'1 6 devotes
some attention to developing the procedural flaws of the trials and
notes that the defense counsel did not enjoy the same sources and
accommodations which were granted to the prosecution."7
Additionally, defendants were not permitted to offer documents
implicating Allied parties, nor were they granted access to the
evidentiary archives. The subject-matter jurisdiction of the IMT
has been criticized as well, particularly the charge of conspira-
cy.118 It is suggested that the inclusion of that charge "stretched
the bounds of legal propriety.""' 9 The Tribunal's indictment of
those who followed the orders of their superiors,'2° as well as its
failure to indict Allied offenders,'2' has also been criticized.
It is often conceded, however, that the proceedings presented
a favorable course of Allied action following the war. 22 It may
be argued that the trials, by drawing attention to the Nazi leader-
ship, possibly averted "lynch justice" from being exacted from the
German civilian population."2  Although Henry Stimson and
other ardent defenders of the trials have been criticized for their
"euphoric" perspective, 24 it has been noted that the trials had to
take place, if for no other purpose than psychological reasons.
125
It is also acknowledged that while Nuremberg clearly did not
render perfect justice, it was perhaps the best means of preserving
the value of international law."2 Moreover, the trials provided
114. DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 591-92.
115. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT, supra note 105, at 304.
116. Brig. General Taylor, Professor Emeritus at Yeshiva and war trial
prosecutor, is the only legal scholar within this group of commentators. Professor
Taylor takes a decidedly different approach to the trials than other English and
American legal scholars.
117. TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 627.
118. Id. at 629; SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 52, 249.
119. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 249.
120. TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 630.
121. DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 591.
122. BEST, supra note 112, at 24; Biddis, supra note 104, at 613; SMITH, ROAD
TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 248; TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 630.
123. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 248. See also BEST, supra
note 112, at 5; DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 588.
124. See DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 588.
125. Id. at 586.
126. BEST, supra note 112, at 24.
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a vent for international anger and, arguably, were a morally
favorable alternative to summary execution."7
C. English and American Jurists and Legal Scholars
Law follows order: it does not precede it.
Sir Hartley Shawcross
If these men are the first war leaders of a defeated nation
to be prosecuted in the name of the law, they are also the first
to be given a chance to plead for their lives in the name of the
law.
Robert H. Jackson
From their commencement, the Nuremberg Trials have drawn
their strongest support from English and American jurists and legal
scholars. These writers may be distinguished from the German
legal scholars and English and American historians in several
respects. First, they generally evince a traditionalist perspective of
the proceedings, which is particularly evident in frequent references
to the role of the IMT in administering moral justice. It was
morally imperative that a trial be conducted."2  The crimes
perpetrated by the Nazis were patently egregious and the world
demanded justice, thus, the framers of the Nuremberg proceedings
had a moral mandate, as well as a commission from the internation-
al community.129 These writers generally convey what Professor
Ole R. Holsti may label a global-realist perspective.' 3° While they
appear to hold realist views regarding the central problems13 ' and
the key actors 32 within the international system, their writings at
the same time elevate the conception of a global society and
recognize a degree of complex interdependence. 133 Additionally,
127. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 259.
128. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE CASE AGAINST THE NAZI WAR
CRIMINALS vi (1946); ROBERT E. CONOT, JUSTICE AT NUREMBERG 523 (1983);
WHITNEY HARRIS, TYRANNY ON TRIAL: THE EVIDENCE AT NUREMBERG 568
(1954); Lord Justice Geoffrey Lawrence, The Nuremberg Trial, 23 INT'L. AF. 151-
59 (1944); AIREY NEAVE, ON TRIAL AT NUREMBERG 324 (1978).
129. Henry L. Stimson, Landmark in Law, 25 FOREIGN AFF. 179-89,182 (1947).
130. See generally Ole R. Holsti, Models of International Relations and Foreign
Policy, 13 DIPL. HIsT. 15 (Winter 1989); International Relations Models, in
EXPLAINING THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 57-88 (Michael
J. Hogar and Thomas G. Patterson eds., 1991).
131. The causes of war and conditions of peace.
132. Nation-states motivated by national interest and security.
133. See Stimson, supra note 129, passim; CONOT, supra note 128, at 522;
HARRIS, supra note 128, at 536.
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this group, while maintaining a realist commitment to the geograph-
ically-based nation-state, evinces an acknowledgment of and a
commitment to the emerging global values and institutions that
transcend the nation-state. 134
These writings also differ from others in that they are often
characterized by an implicit acknowledgment of Anglo-American
exceptionalism. Indeed, the proceedings were an American
proposal, they were prompted by an Anglo-American conception
of justice, and they were fashioned according to Anglo-American
principles of jurisprudence. Moreover, the largely Anglo-American
endeavor was nothing less than a legal milestone. This scholarship
also devotes considerable attention to the role of public opinion in
the formation and execution of the trials.131 Indeed, public
opinion is interwoven with moralism throughout many of the
writings. Additionally, some attention is given to the role of
ideology in the proceedings, as is evidenced by references to Anglo-
American perceptions of justice, international law, and world
order.1 36
While English and American legal scholars have generally
been the strongest advocates of the trials, their writings, also
exhibit, moreso than other principal groups, a more orthodox
approach to international law. Treaties and custom serve as
binding law, and nation-states are to be held to the principle of
pacta sunt servanda. Additionally, individuals, no less than states,
are subject to this law.
English and American legal scholarship on the Nuremberg
Trials is also characterized by a consistent, apologetical approach
to criticism from the trials' detractors. A new era of global-
interdependence emerged following World War I, as did a new era
of warfare.137 Modern advances in technology placed unprece-
dented destructive capability into the hands of individual actors,
and this destructive capability demanded heightened international
interaction and cooperation, as well as further development of
substantive and procedural international law, to ensure global
stability and national security. Increased global interaction brought
the conclusion of numerous treaties and agreements codifying
international custom and aspiration. These agreements included
134. See Lawrence, supra note 128, at 156; Stimson, supra note 129, at 184-85,
188-89; HARRIS, supra note 128, at 536.
135. See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 128, at 152; Stimson, supra note 129, at 179.
136. See Stimson, supra note 129, passim.
137. Id. at 182, 184.
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the Hague and Geneva Conventions, as well as the idealistic
Kellogg-Briand Pact. As a signatory to each, it may be contended
that Germany endorsed the very law invoked at the Nuremberg
proceedings. Thus, the substantive law relied upon by the IMT,
save the charge of conspiracy, was not novel, nor was it unknown
to Germany.13 Moreover, it may be argued that customary law,
like the common law, could never evolve if a claim of ex post facto
application could defeat the first case which recognized the
emergence of a new rule.
Little effort has been made, however, to explain the procedural
novelty of the trials. This may suggest a reliance upon several
extenuating factors as evidence of the legitimacy of the proceed-
ings. For example, by the time the IMT was organized in 1945, the
Permanent Court of International Justice had conducted proceed-
ings as an organ of the League of Nations for more than two
decades. While the Permanent Court did not have jurisdiction over
criminal acts, proposals for broadened jurisdiction were offered
rather routinely, conveying to nations the possibility of expanded
jurisdiction.'39 Equally significant, international legal procedure
historically had been established on an ad hoc basis. Thus,
Germany was not without warning as regards the possible inclusion
of criminal conduct within international court jurisdiction, or the
implementation of unprecedented procedure. Additionally, a
precedent for the adjudication of alleged war criminals was
established when German leaders were brought to trial, if only
perfunctorily, in Leipzig following World War I. The concept of
adjudicating the conduct of military leaders, therefore, clearly was
not novel in 1945.
English and American legal scholars have also argued that the
concept of giving precedence to international law over municipal
law, and the practice of holding individuals accountable under the
law of nations, was not revolutionary." This principle was
inherent in the conventions which established guidelines for the
138. See Harold Levanthal et al., The Nuremberg Verdict, 60 HARV. L. REV.
857-907 (1947); SHELDON GLUECK, NUREMBERG TRIAL AND AGGRESSIVE WAR
11, 105 (1946); Lawrence, supra note 128, at 154; Stimson, supra note 129, at 180;
HARRIS, supra note 128, at 530.
139. For a concise but thorough history of substantive and procedural
international criminal law, see M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST
HUMANITY IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 147-91 (1992).
140. See Lawrence, supra note 128, at 156; GLUECK, supra note 138, at 63, 92.
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conduct of war.141 As early as 1887, United States Secretary of
State Thomas F Bayard observed:
[I]t is only necessary to say, that if a Government could set up
its own municipal laws as the final test of its international rights
and obligations, then the rules of international law would be but
a shadow of a name and would afford no protection either to
States or to individuals.142
Still another perspective in the debate over primacy was
offered by Sir Geoffrey Lawrence, the presiding justice on the IMT,
who noted that by November 1945 the Allied powers constituted
the de facto government of Germany and, through Germany's
unconditional surrender, the Allies became the de jure government
as well. 3 Thus, the Charter of London, which served as the
restatement of the law to be applied at the trials, arguably could
have been construed to have been the municipal law of Germany
as well. Lawrence was not the only official to posit this claim. It
was also advanced by the Secretary General of the United Nations
in his official analysis of the IMT.1"
"Nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine lege" was the most
commonly invoked defense during the trials. Defenders of the
proceedings responded by merely directing detractors to alleged jus
cogens principles and existing conventional law, the latter of which
bore signatures rendered on behalf of the people of Germany.45
Harvard law professor Sheldon Glueck, exhibiting a global-
interdependence perspective, further noted that nullum crimen sine
lege, as a defense, applies only to peaceful intercourse among
nations, and cannot be invoked to excuse "barbarism."" 4
The failure of the Tribunal to indict the alleged Allied war
criminals stands without justification and, indeed, no effort is made
by these writers to defend this inequity. This omission, coupled
with a Soviet presence on the IMT, probably did more than any
other legal controversy to discredit the proceedings. It certainly
141. Stimson, supra note 129, at 180; GLUECK, supra note 138, at 63, 92;
Lawrence, supra note 128, at 156; HARRIS, supra note 128, at 530-31.
142. FOREIGN RELATIONS 751, 753 (1887).
143. Lawrence, supra note 128, at 155.
144. SECRETARY GENERAL LIE, THE CHARTER AND JUDGMENT OF THE
NUREMBERG TRIBUNAL 79 (1949).
145. See Hague IV, supra note 31 and accompanying text; Laws and Customs
of Land on War, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. 539, 1 Bevans 631; Geneva Convention, supra
note 32; Genova Protocol, supra note 32; Kellogg-Briand Peace Pact, supra note
33.
146. GLUECK, supra note 138, at 22.
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provided ample fodder for Nuremberg critics. And while this
group of writers offers no excuses for the Tribunal's failure to
indict alleged Allied, and most notably Soviet war criminals,
Professor Glueck attempted to bring the matter into perspective:
[W]hether Russia is or is not guilty of a war of aggression is not
relevant to the present issue before the court at Nuremberg.
There the question is whether or not Germany and her agents
are guilty of such a war... If the law has indeed been violated
by a party temporarily outside the power of the sovereign
authority, the offense still remains; there is no statute of
limitations involved. In the meantime, it cannot reasonably be
argued that the prosecution of so patent and chronic an
aggressor as Germany should be infinitely postponed until such
a time as all alleged malefactors can be haled before an
international court. 47
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson added:
There was, somewhere in our distant past, a first case of
murder, a first case where the tribe replaced the victim's family
as judge of the offender. The tribe had learned that the
deliberate and malicious killing of any human being was, and
must be treated as, an offense against the whole communi-
V. Judging the Present by the Past
Although it may be months before the fighting in the former
Yugoslavia is brought to a close, and many years before all the
Balkan war criminals are brought before the Tribunal, the
machinery for the process is in place and prosecution has begun.
Enough steps have been taken by the UN to provide observers
with sufficient data for commentary; and while a generation may
pass before historians take up the task of commenting on the trials,
there is already ample fodder for debate among legal scholars,
particularly in light of the criticism generated by the Nuremberg
proceedings. Indeed, there was a flurry of legal debate through
1993 and much of 1994, and there remains a steady stream of
commentary from human rights scholars. Most within the legal
profession, however, like the rest of the international community,
appear to be watching and waiting for the next sequence of events
147. Id.
148. Stimson, supra note 129, at 180.
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to unfold. Some insightful commentary has emerged, however,
doubtless offering a foreshadowing of the scholarship to come.
The criticism that has been leveled at both the Nuremberg and
Yugoslav Trials may be divided into two categories: political and
legal. For the purposes of this analysis, criticism will be construed
as political if it touches upon the policy concerns, foreign or
domestic, of those powers represented on the IMT or the Interna-
tional Tribunal. Criticism will be considered legal, on the other
hand, if it relates to the substantive and procedural law relied upon
by either court.
A. Political Criticism
1. Historic Trials.-Like the Nuremberg Trials, the Balkan
proceedings may be challenged as historic trials. It has already
been suggested that the United Nation's latest effort is merely a
"'victor's tribunal' . . . set up belatedly by the winners of the
Second World War."'149 Thus construed, the International Tribu-
nal is an organ of the Western-dominated Security Council rather
than one elected by, and representative of, the General Assembly.
Cast in this light, the Tribunal is an affront to the sovereignty of all
UN members, for its legal basis rests on nothing more than the
Council's tendentious reading, and arbitrary invocation, of Chapter
VII of the UN Charter. 50
Additionally, it may be suggested that the trials are being
conducted at the behest of the Council merely in an attempt to
compensate for more than four decades of institutional paralysis.
Holding the several countries of the former Yugoslavia, all of which
are second-world countries and none a major power, responsible
for violations which have been committed with apparent impunity
by major powers, suggests that Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia and
Montenegro are being put on trial only because they have neither
the military nor economic wherewithal to persuade the Council to
do otherwise. Moreover, that China, one of the leading violators
of human rights, should sit in judgment over another power which
is being accused of crimes against humanity, may be perceived as
tantamount to Russia's presence on the IMT.
149. Alfred P. Rubin, International Crime and Punishment, THE NAT'L
INTEREST 73, 74 (Fall 1993).
150. See generally Payam Akhavan, Enforcement of the Genocide Convention:
A Challenge to Civilization, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 229 (1995).
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2. Political Ideology as the Driving Factor-Among the
political criticism common to both the German legal scholars and
historians is the notion that political ideology, rather than justice,
was the.primary impetus for the Nuremberg Trials.151 Thus, the
proceedings may be construed as much a political event as a legal
one. Indeed, it has been noted that "those who would draw a clear
distinction between law and politics are to be found more in ivory
towers than in corridors of power." '152 Not surprisingly, it has also
been argued that the Nuremberg Trials were merely a tool of
Allied foreign policy,153 and an attempt to educate the German
people in, and compel compliance with, Western ideals."M The
very composition of the present International Tribunal, eleven
judges from as many countries all of whom were elected by the
General Assembly of the United Nations, is certainly less inviting
of such criticism than was the IMT. But its diversity notwithstand-
ing, the Court has drawn criticism in this regard. It has been
suggested that the International Tribunal is driven by political
expediency rather than justice, and that it may conduct the trials in
a manner "consistent with the political interests of certain powers
and that is, bring the small fry [before the Court], [and] prosecute
them," while ignoring key figures who have been identified as war
criminals. 55 Time will tell if there are grounds for this claim, but
the diversity of the Court and the independence of the Prosecutor
casts some doubt upon its plausibility. While the IMT could hardly
be considered homogeneous, the Yugoslav Tribunal is even less so.
The political and economic systems and the respective interests of
the representative countries are as diverse as the Court itself.
Drawn from five continents, the justices of the International
Tribunal represent socialist as well as capitalist economies, and
totalitarian as well as republican governments.'56 It is difficult to
imagine a tenable claim against such a heterogeneous body on
151. Kranzbuehler, supra note 83, at 106; Ehard, supra note 82, at 233;
DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 592; SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT, supra note 105,
at xvii; SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 252; Biddis, supra note
104, at 611; TUSA & TUSA, supra note 77, at 492.
152. David P. Forsythe, Politics and the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L. F. 401 (1994).
153. Ehard, supra note 82, at 233.
154. Kranzbuehler, supra note 83, at 106.
155. Ambassador Muhamad Sacirbey, Remarks, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 63, 67
(1994).
156. For a listing of the countries represented on the International Tribunal, see
supra note 16.
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ideological grounds. But, the key issue, of course, is the composi-
tion of the Security Council under whose authority the Tribunal
was created. Professor David Forsythe makes the argument that
the policy which established and drives the Tribunal is the product
of a few key states.157 To be sure, the Security Council is domi-
nated by Western powers and allegations of political collusion
against this body cannot be easily dismissed.
3. An Inadequate Forum.-The Nuremberg Tribunal has also
drawn criticism for being an inadequate forum for establishing a
new world order.158 Interestingly, however, its detractors have
proposed no alternatives. Clearly, the purpose of the Yugoslav
Trials is not to establish a new world order; nevertheless, the
adequacy of the International Tribunal as a forum for maintaining
order and deterring future criminal acts may be called into
question.
Whether or not an ad hoc international tribunal is a sufficient
means of dealing with criminal behavior and whether such an organ
presents a suitable deterrent has long been a subject of debate. A
permanent venue may offer a stronger deterrent to deviant
conduct, and would likely be capable of dealing more efficiently
with that conduct. It has been argued recently that UN coalition
military commissions and tribunals may prove a more efficacious
alternative to ad hoc international efforts."5 9 The creation of an
international penal code may be more effective still. The Interna-
tional Tribunal, like the International Court of Justice, does
however operate under the authority of the UN and, indeed, enjoys
the same setting as the ICJ. 6 Absent the extension of criminal
jurisdiction to the ICJ, or the creation of a permanent tribunal and
the incorporation of a penal code, ad hoc organs such as the
present one appear to offer the most efficient means toward the
desired end.
B. Legal Criticism
1. Ex Post Facto Law.-Several challenges to the law
invoked by the IMT have been offered by Nuremberg detractors.
Foremost among these complaints was the alleged application of ex
157. Forsythe, supra note 152, at 402.
158. DAVIDSON, supra note 105, at 591-92.
159. See Robinson 0. Everett & Scott L. Silliman, Forums for Punishing
Offenses Against the Law of Nations, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 509 (1994).
160. Statute, supra note 49, art. 31.
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post facto law: a claim grounded in the presumption that the
Charter of London, rather than existing customs and conventions,
was the source of the substantive law invoked by the IMT."6
While the International Tribunal, like the IMT, is an ad hoc body,
it enjoys the advantage of being able to invoke conventional human
rights principles which have been standard fare in international
jurisprudence for nearly a century. Moreover, the Security Council
has determined to apply only that law which is "beyond any doubt
part of customary law."'162 At least three possible points of
contention, however, remain: First, it may be argued that the
Tribunal has invoked customary law which, although applicable to
international conflicts, is not applicable to internal conflicts such as
that in the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal, however, was created
under color of the authority of Chapter VII, rendering the Bosnian
Conflict, ipso facto, an international situation. It may be argued,
then, that any distinction between the civil or international
character of the conflict in that theater, as a practical matter, is
irrelevant.
Secondly, it may be suggested, as claimed by the critics of the
Nuremberg Trials, that the rules of law relied upon by the
International Tribunal, conventional or customary, still contain no
penal element. The Security Council, noting this deficiency, has
provided for the International Tribunal to resort to municipal law,
namely, the practice of sentencing in the courts of the former
Yugoslavia to fill any gaps in the existing international law.1"
Without amending the existing law to include penal provisions, this
compromise appears to offer the best solution. Moreover, it is
counterintuitive to suggest that the United Nations should have the
authority to advance and demand adherence to fundamental,
inviolable human rights, but be precluded from exacting any
161. See Ehard, supra note 82, at 223; Kranzbuehler, supra note 83, at 106;
Kranzbuehler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 334;
Pannenbecker, supra note 83, at 349; Kraus, supra note 83, at 245; Bader, supra
note 83, at 177.
162. Statute, supra note 49, art. 1, para. 34, 35. "The part of conventional
international humanitarian law which has beyond doubt become part of
international customary law is the law applicable in armed conflict as embodied
in: The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949 for the Protection of War
Victims; the Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land and the Regulations annexed thereto of October 18, 1907; the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9, 1948;
and the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of August 8, 1945." Id. art.
1, para. 35.
163. Statute, supra note 49, art. 1, para. 36.
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penalty from violators. Such a claim must rest upon absence of
notice, notwithstanding a growing body of principles to which all
member nations are required to accede, a claim which could not be
advanced in good faith.
Finally, it may be contended that the International Tribunal
should not have jurisdiction over acts committed before its
inception. However, until the International Court of Justice is
given jurisdiction over criminal matters or a permanent internation-
al criminal court is established, the international community must
rely upon ad hoc efforts which, by their very nature, must be
formed after the fact to enforce international law. To deny an ad
hoc tribunal jurisdiction over acts which necessitated, but preceded,
its formation, would merely accord prospective violators a window
of opportunity to act with impunity.
2. Individual Criminal Responsibility.-Individual criminal
responsibility for violations of international law was first advanced
in the Treaty of Versailles 6 Heretofore, nations, rather than
individual actors, had been held solely responsible for violations of
international law.16 Not surprisingly, many critics of the Nurem-
berg proceedings challenged the London Agreement's provision for
individual criminal responsibility."6 The provision was attacked
on two levels. First, it was decried as novel and unfounded for
expanding individual responsibility to include heads of state acting
on behalf of governments. Heads of state, it was claimed, acted at
the behest of their countries and, as such, should not be held
individually liable." This argument was advanced notwithstand-
ing Allied demands following World War I that the Dutch
surrender Germany's Wilhelm II for trial.1" The provision was
also challenged on the ground that it did not acknowledge the
doctrine of respondeat superior as a permissible defense.169
Military personnel under orders to act in violation of international
law were given a Hobson's choice: punishment by their own
164. See Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, S. Doc. 51, 66th Cong., 1st Sess.,
2 Bevans 43, at 136-37.
165. On individual responsibility under international law prior to World War
I, see L. OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAW, at 19, 341 (1906).
166. Behling, supra note 85, at 177-88; Kraus, supra note 83, at 238; Kranzbueh-
ler, Nuremberg Eighteen Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 339; Ehard, supra note
82, at 232-36; Haensel, supra note 85, at 146-52.
167. Kraus, supra note 83, at 243; Ehard, supra note 82, at 233; Bader, supra
note 83, at 178; Haensel, supra note 85, at 253.
168. Treaty of Versailles, supra note 164, art. 227.
169. Kraus, supra note 83, at 238.
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country, or at the hands of the international community. This
dilemma notwithstanding, the principle of individual culpability
under international law dates back to the Leipzig Trials which
followed the First World War.
This principle is clearly one of the most notable contributions
that the Nuremberg Trials has bestowed upon the International
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Whether or not individual
responsibility, non-immunity for heads of state, or the refusal to
permit respondeat superior as a defense against conviction were
novel or unfounded in 1945, all three doctrines are, largely because
of Nuremberg, generally held to be customary law.17 These laws
are embodied in the Statute of the International Tribunal under
article seven, which further states that although the principle of
respondeat superior may not be invoked as a defense for criminal
behavior, it may mitigate punishment and may be used by the
Prosecution to attach responsibility to a superior who "knew or had
reason to know that [their] subordinate was about to commit such
acts or had done so and the superior failed to take the necessary
and reasonable measures to prevent such acts or to punish the
perpetrator thereof.""17 The precedent provided by the Nurem-
berg Trials, and the subsequent incorporation of the doctrine into
several conventions should cause the inclusion of this principle in
the Statute of the International Tribunal to be subject to less
critical scholarship than was its inclusion in the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal.
3. Composition of the Court.-Perhaps one of the most
credible complaints against the Charter of London was its failure
to provide for a prosecutor and judge from either Germany or a
neutral country.1 72 The Charter provided for one prosecutor, one
judge and one alternate judge from each of the four principal
signatories. Had a neutral or German prosecutor presented the
same claims to the Tribunal that the Allied prosecutors presented,
the Nuremberg verdict likely would have carried more credibility
with the German people and the proceedings may not have been
viewed simply as victors' justice. The mere presence of a German
judge, or perhaps even a judge from a neutral country, might have
contributed considerably to the legitimacy of the Trials.
170. BASSIOUNI, supra note 139 and accompanying text.
171. Statute, supra note 49, art. 7, para. 3.
172. See Kraus, supra note 83, at 247; Ehard, supra note 82, at 243; Haensel,
supra note 85, at 258.
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The composition of the Yugoslav Tribunal stands in sharp
contrast to that of its predecessor. The Security Council has taken
pains to assemble a democratically elected Tribunal, but its failure
to ensure the presence of a judge from the territory of the former
Yugoslavia invites the same criticism suffered by the IMT. It
comes, then, as little surprise that the composition of the Court was
among the first points of contention for the Bosnian government.
The Bosnian Ambassador to the United Nations, Muhammad
Sacribey, has alleged that the absence of a Yugoslav judge was
designed to "create the impression ... that the people of the
Balkans are somehow beyond the norm of civilized behavior." 73
Obvious problems would be encountered, however, if the General
Assembly were to elect a judge from any of the Balkan republics
other than Slovenia or Macedonia. And until the issue of collabo-
ration is dealt with definitively, an appointment from either of
these republics may be problematic as well.
Another specter is raised by the religious diversity of the
region in conflict, and the religious composition of the respective
armies. The battle for control of Bosnia-Herzegovina is in large
measure a religious war; it is a struggle between Bosnian Muslims
and Bosnian-Serb Christians. As may be expected, the Bosnian
Ambassador has criticized the United Nations on this count as well,
claiming that eighty percent of the victims of the Balkan Crisis are
Muslim, yet there are no Muslims seated on the Court.'74 He has
also alleged that Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who has directed
the investigation of the Balkan atrocities, was denied appointment
as Prosecutor in part because he is a ethnically Muslim. 7'
4. The Role of Municipal Law.-Among the least tenable
claims against the Nuremberg proceedings was the charge that the
framers of the Charter, and subsequently the IMT itself, failed to
rely upon municipal law as a source of international law. 76 Had
there been an absence of customary and conventional law, this
allegation may have had some foundation. But the credibility, or
incredibility, of the claim notwithstanding, the International
Tribunal has the advantage of invoking law which dates back
173. Sacirbey, supra note 155, at 66.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See Behling, supra note 85, at 179; Kranzbuehler, Nuremberg Eighteen
Years Afterward, supra note 82, at 339; Kraus, supra note 83, at 243; Haensel,
supra note 85, at 251-52.
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several decades and has been acceded to by almost every member
of the international community. Unlike the IMT, the International
Tribunal will base its proceedings upon law which the United
Nations holds to be beyond dispute.177 Additionally, that which
is not expressly provided for by existing custom, will be drawn from
the municipal law of the region in conflict, making the claim that
municipal law alone should form a basis for the substantive and
procedural law of the Yugoslav Trials even less tenable than it was
in 1945.
5. Selective Indictments.-Of all the shortcomings of the
Nuremberg Trials, the IMT's failure to indict Allied offenders is
certainly among the most deserving of criticism. Indeed, the
absence of Allied indictments has drawn criticism from the Trials'
most ardent supporters as well as its detractors. American Chief
Prosecutor Robert H. Jackson, in his opening argument before the
IMT, noted: "While this law is first applied against German
aggressors, if it is to serve any useful purpose it must condemn
aggression by any other nations, including those which sit here now
in judgment. 78"'  The International Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia faces a situation which is, in many respects, quite unlike
that which confronted the IMT. The Bosnian Conflict has not
produced a victor, and may never do so. None of the belligerent
governments have been destroyed or replaced, and there is no
occupational power attempting to administrate the region. If the
Prosecutor is careful to indict all offenders and their conspirators,
regardless of nationality or official position, then the International
Tribunal should be able to avoid the criticism leveled at the IMT
for its selective pursuit of justice.
Likewise, the International Tribunal must remain mindful of
the needs of the defense counsel to avoid criticism similar to that
drawn by the IMT. It has been suggested by Telford Taylor that
the attorneys for the Nuremberg defendants did not enjoy full
access to the IMT's evidentiary archives. 79 Again, the circum-
stances which distinguish the two tribunals should prove a determi-
native factor. Because the Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia has
only one prosecutor rather than four, the Yugoslav Trials should
not suffer from the same bureaucracy that plagued the Nuremberg
proceedings. Furthermore, because the International Tribunal is
177. Statute, supra note 49, art. 1(a).
178. ROBERT H. JACKSON, 1 NUREMBERG PROCEEDINGS (1945).
179. TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 627.
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not an organ of an occupying power or powers, and because the
site of the trials is not also the seat of an occupying government,
the proceedings should not present the same concerns encountered
at Nuremberg. The International Tribunal is seated at the
Hague; s thus, both prosecution and defense will be able to
function in a neutral environment which was created solely to
facilitate peaceful intercourse and dispute resolution among nations.
Whatever concerns prompted allegations that the defense counsel
at Nuremberg were denied full access to evidentiary archives
should not be present at the Hague. If legal representatives for the
Balkan defendants are granted access to the same sources as the
prosecution, if there is a fair exchange of discovery, and if defen-
dants are permitted to offer into evidence documents implicating
additional parties (i.e., Montenegrans, Croats, Slovenians and
Macedonians) then the International Tribunal arguably will have
done everything foreseeable to guard against claims that a suitable
defense for the alleged Balkan war criminals were made impractica-
ble.
6. Conspiracy or Common Plan.-If there was one aspect of
the Nuremberg proceedings that was patently novel, it was the
inclusion of the charge of conspiracy or common plan. Conse-
quently, it has been almost universally decried by all but the Trials'
staunchest advocates.1 81  It has been claimed that the charge
"stretched the bounds of legal propriety."" Nuremberg lawyer
and legal scholar Otto Pannenbecker called it "dubious and
illegal." The inclusion of the charge was clearly the product of
English and American influence. Indeed, the doctrine of conspira-
cy was exclusive to Anglo-American municipal law. Consequently,
its inclusion placed defense attorneys at an obvious disadvantage
and left the French and Russian prosecutors somewhat confound-
ed. 84
Regardless of its singularity in 1945, the charge has been
included in the Statute of the International Tribunal,1 85 and this
180. Statute, supra note 49, art. 31.
181. Haensel, supra note 85, at 250; Behling, supra note 85, at; Kraus, supra
note 83, at 245; Ehard, supra note 82, at 226-27, 231; Pannenbecker, supra note 83,
at 351; TAYLOR, supra note 23, at 629; SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note
86, at 52, 249.
182. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 249..
183. Pannenbecker, supra note 83, at 351.
184. SMITH, ROAD TO NUREMBERG, supra note 86, at 52.
185. Statute, supra note 49, art. 6, para. 54.
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time, not without precedent, and thus not without notice. Since its
international debut at Nuremberg, the concept of conspiracy or
common plan has found its way into numerous multinational
conventions, including the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide which serves as a source of
subject-matter jurisdiction for the International Tribunal.'86
Whether or not conspiracy or common plan is a, doctrine found in
the municipal law of-the former Yugoslavia, it has, through
incorporation in the Nuremberg Trials and subsequent international
agreements, become a relatively widely-known, perhaps even
customary, concept in international law.
VI. Conclusion: Drawing Conclusions
The United Nations' management of the Balkan situation has
drawn criticism from several scholars over the past four years. It
has been suggested that the Security Council did too little, too late,
in light of the carnage." 7 It has also been argued that the time
to act was "at the end of the Croatian War when it was obvious
what was going to happen to Bosnia."" The UN's commitment
to the investigation and prosecution of the alleged atrocities has
been called "shaky, if not shameful." '189 It also has been suggest-
ed that the International Tribunal was formed for diplomatic,
rather than judicial, purposes: that it is public opinion, rather than
justice, that is the driving force behind the Council.19° Addition-
ally, the proposed trials have been denounced altogether as an
inherently hypocritical effort by enthusiasts. 91 Still others have
avoided the legal underpinnings of the Tribunal, focusing instead
on the negative impact the proceedings may have upon prospects
for peace in the region" and the advancement of human
rights. 93
Criticism and obvious shortcomings notwithstanding, the
formation of the International Tribunal has been generally well-
-received. The establishment of the Court has been applauded
186. Id. art. 4.
187. Panel Discussion: Bosnia, War Crimes and Humanitarian Intervention, 15
WHITTIER L. REV. 445, 447 (1994).
188. Id. at 462.
189. Id. at 447.
190. Sacirbey, supra note 155, at 65.
191. Rubin, supra note 149, at 74-75.
192. See Anthony D'Amato, Peace vs. Accountability in Bosnia, 88 A.J.I.L. 500
(1994).
193. See Forsythe, supra note 152.
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because it offers "a new lease on life" for international criminal law
and "portends at least some deterrence of future violation:" '194 a
benefit which redounds to all nations.195 These are the obvious
advantages to be gained from revitalizing conventional and
customary law which have been too-seldom enforced for a half-
century. But what are the lessons to be learned from the Nurem-
berg Trials, and the five decades of scholarship they generated?
Through an examination of the scholarship, the pitfalls become
apparent: The role of ideology in shaping the proceedings; the
nature of the forum; the conducting of historic trials; reliance upon
ex post facto law; inclusion of individual criminal responsibility;
prejudicial appointment of judges; the role of municipal law;
selective indictments; the inability to conduct a suitable defense;
and inclusion of the doctrine of conspiracy. When the Statute of
the International Tribunal is examined vis-A-vis the Charter of the
International Military Tribunal, in light of post-World War II
developments in international humanitarian law, the majority of the
pitfalls that haunted the IMT appear to have been guarded against.
Considerable pains have been taken to present the International
Tribunal as a legitimate organ of the General Assembly, and not
one dominated by any one nation or coalition. The substantive law
to be invoked by the Tribunal dates back as much as a century, is
grounded in some of history's most celebrated treaties, and is held
by the General Assembly to be beyond dispute. Also beyond
dispute is the matter of individual and organizational liability under
the law.
The Statute is not above reproach, however. A colorable
argument has been raised regarding the ideological influence
driving the investigation and future prosecution.196 Additionally,
two major issues have been broached: The absence of Yugoslav
and Muslim judges on the Tribunal, and the possibility that like
Nuremberg, the Yugoslav proceedings will amount to little more
than historic trials.1" Although proceedings have commenced,
the former may still be remedied. The latter is an unfortunate
consequence of the United Nations' failure to follow through on
194. Theodore Meron, Comments: War Crimes in Yugoslavia and the
Development of International Law, 88 A.J.I.L. 78 (1994).
195. James C. O'Brien, Current Development: The International Tribunal for
Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the former Yugoslavia, 87 A.J.I.L.
639, 658 (1993).
196. Sacirbey, supra note 155, at 67.
197. Id. at 66.
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the international legal developments forged at Nuremberg and only
time will tell what kind of legacy will be left by this effort.
But what of imperatives? Now, more than in 1945, the words
of Henry Stimson ring true. More than any time in history,
members of the international community are placed in a state of
global-interdependence. Indeed, it has been noted that nations are
"no longer merely interdependent," they are inextricably
linked.19 Moreover, modern technology has placed unimagined
destructive capabilities at the disposal of numerous countries and
individuals. These factors demand heightened international
cooperation and the furtherance of substantive and procedural
international law, as well as the development of international
judicial bodies, to ensure global stability.
Not even the staunchest supporters of the IMT have claimed
that perfect justice was rendered at Nuremberg, and it may not be
rendered as the trials progress at the Hague. But there remains a
consensus among commentators on the Allied judicial effort: the
adjudication of the Nazi war criminals played an invaluable
stabilizing role in postwar-Europe. International human rights and
humanitarian law have advanced markedly in the decades following
the Nuremberg proceedings, with more than fifty conventions
drafted under the auspices of the UN. But equally important,
allegations were investigated and individuals, rather than an entire
population, were tried, convicted and punished. With the convic-
tion of nineteen Nazi defendants, the German people were, in
effect, exonerated. Absent an international judicial element,
vigilante justice would likely have been exacted from the German
populace, possibly sparking a vicious cycle of reprisals. Imperfect
as the substantive and procedural law may be, war crimes trials
provide for targeted retribution and offer a relatively immediate
sense of vindication. It was, arguably, the psychological benefits
derived from prompt, internationally recognized and validated
investigation, conviction, retribution and vindication that were the
most important consequences of the Nuremberg proceedings. It is,
arguably, these same psychological benefits which will bode most
important in the Yugoslav Trials and most beneficial in the return
to normalcy. Global stability and national security are contingent
upon the actions of even the smallest international actors now more
198. Kofi Annan, Peace-keeping in Situations of Civil War, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & POL. 623 (1994).
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than ever before, for while international law has advanced
markedly over a half-century, human nature has not.
